PREFACE
This paper is part of a larger task in Systems and Decision Sciences that is concerned with institutional structures and their role in shaping decisions. A particular problem in this field is to characterize the formal processes or rules by which groups of decision makers should choose among available alternatives. Typically, these rules are formulated as specific voting procedures. This article examines certain common-sense properties of voting rules and describes a particular rule that is shown to be the unique one satisfying these properties. The first half of the paper introduces the basic concepts and summarizes the results; the second half is devoted to a detailed proof, using convex analysis, of the principal theorem. INTRODUCTION In France during the latter half of the eighteenth century, the problem of designing voting rules for an assembly began to be studied systematically for the first time.
Two of the major contributors were Jean-Charles de Borda and Marie J.A.N. Caritat,
Marquis de Condorcet, both members of 11Acad6mie Royale des
Sciences. From these two men sprang two streams of thought on the problem of collective decision making that persist to the present day. In 1770, Borda [4] read a paper before the Academy in which he proposed the following method, which he called "election by order of merit": for each voter's announced (linear) preference order on the alternatives, a score of 0 is assigned to the least preferred alternative, 1 to the next-~o-least preferred, and so forth; then the total score of each alternative is computed and the one with the highest score is declared the winner. Condorcet [6] proposed instead that if there is some alternative (the Condorcet alternative) that defeats every other in pairwise simple majority voting, then that alternative should be selected. A difficulty with Borda's rule is that it nay not result in the choice of the Condorcet alternative (as in Example 1 where al is the Condorcet alternative and a2, the Borda choice); but a difficulty with Condorcet's principle is that, if a Condorcet alternative does not exist, it is unclear which alternative should be chosen.
Example I.

Number of voters
The challenge of combining the regularity of Borda's approach with Condorcet's principle into a unified method is a long-standing problem in the theory of elections. Black [31 proposed that the Condorcet alternative be chosen when one exists, and otherwise that the Borda method be reverted to.
This somewhat ad hoc proposal avoids the fundamental issue of choosing properties that are natural in the context of election,
and then asking what (if any) methods have these properties.
In this paper we shall identify certain basic properties suggested by the Borda and the Condorcet approaches, respectively, and show that these pr~perties uniquely determine a method first proposed by John Kemeny [lo, 111. Let A = {al,a2,...,am~ be a set of m alternatives under consideration, Ej = {0,1,2, ...I the names of the possible voters.
A preference order on A is simply a linear order. In general, a Condorcet alternative is any alternative ai such that nij($) 2 0 for all j # i. We say that a PF f is Condorcet if (6) nij ($1 > 0 implies not (. . .a. ,ai.. .) E f ($) 3 and We say that a PF (or a CP) f is consistent on a subdomain 0's 0 if whenever I$',$" E Of, and $' + $" is defined and contained in 0'; then Let r be the subdomain of profiles for which a Condorcet alternative exists, that is (9) r = {$ E O: nij (4) ) 0 for some i and all j f i} .
It is easy to see that any Condorcet choice function is consistent on the domain T. One of the difficulties in trying to find a natural way to extend Condorcet's principle to the domain O-r (which is nonempty if m 2 3) is that it is impossible to find such an extension which is consistent as a choice function.
Theorem 2. There is no Condorcet choice function g and
Proof.+ Let m be the number of alternatives. For m = 1 or 2, r = 0 and there is nothing to prove.
Consider then the case m 2 3, and let A r, $* E A-r. (10) Corollary.
For m L 3, no scoring CF is Condorcet.
Theorem 2 does not imply, however, that consistency for preference functions is incompatible with Condorcet's principle. We shall in fact show that there is a preference function with these two properties, and that subject to neutrality, it is unique. 4 here.
The problem defined in [lo] is that of finding a consensus preference order for alternatives being considered by a group of "experts". The approach is to reduce the problem "to one which is analogous to those of classical statistics" [ll, p. 91
by introducing the idea of a distance measure between any two preference orders. The object then is to axiomatize some measure of distance uniquely. This is achieved by the usual sort of geometric conditions (including the triangle inequality), a certain notion of "betweenness", a kind of independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, and by a normalization assunption
The result of these axioms is the distance measure, which can be described as follows.
With each preference order a E L(A) associate an m x m skew symmetric matrix xu, whose rows and columns are labelled by the a alternatives, such that the (ai,a.) entry, xij, is 1 if ai is I preferred to a in a, -1 if a is preferred to ai, and 0 if a j j i = j.
X is called the election matrix for a. Similarly, if I $ is any non-null profile, the election matrix for @ is defined to be If $ is null then set X' Z 0. Notice that the (ai,a.) entry of ' I X is precisely nij ($1 .
The Kemeny distance between any two permutations o and T is given by
The difficulty with this approach is: having achieved the distance measure, it is not clear how to use it to find a consensus.
In other words, given a profile @, what is the ordering that can be said to be "least-distant" from the individuals' orderings in @? Kemeny proposes two alternate solutions from statistics: the median and the mean.
Given @, a median ranking is defined to be any T such that Notice that ai is a Condorcet alternative for @ if and only if the aith row of Xm is nonnegative. If ai is the unique Condorcet alternative (i-e., the a th row of X@ is positive exi cept for position (ai,ai)) then a is necessarily most-preferred i in any preference order in K($I).
The fact that Kemeny's median rule is Condorcet was not mentioned by Kemeny, though it provides an excellent reason to prefer the median over the mean. This fact was first pointed out in [12] , where a characterization of Kemeny's rule for two and three alternatives was given in terms of six properties.
In this paper we shall extend and generalize these results by showing that, for any number of alternatives, the Kemeny rule is the unique preference function that is neutral, consistent and Condorcet, thus reconciling the consistency aspect of Borda's rule with Condorcet's principle.
We have already noted above that K is Condorcet; it is also immediate that it is symmetric.
We claim that K is consistent (as a PF). Indeed, if b' + b" is defined and if there is a T that maximizes both X" xr and x'" . xr, then any such T maximizes x"+"' . xr = (x" + x'") . xr as well. Moreover, for any other r' such that (x" + x@") xT' = (x@' + x@") . xrr \re must have X" xr' = X" xr and x@" xr = x@" . xr, proving that whenever the latter is nonempty.
Before proving that these conditions uniquely characterize K, we turn to a consideration of the polytope whose extreme u points are the election matrices X , a E L (A). This polytope turns out to have important applications to a variety of combinatorial optimization problems [171.
PERMUTATION POLYTOPES Let
To compute K(@) for any +, it suffices to consider the linear programming problem: maximize X ' X over all X E P. The opu timum extreme points X give the consensus ranking (s) u E K (I$) .
P is a linear transformation of a so-called permutation polytope [5, 17] : if J is the mxmmatrix of all l's, and I is the mxm identity matrix, then the transformation defines the permutation polytope P' associated with P. The set of inequalities defining P' (and hence P) are not explicitly known (Bowman having proposed an insufficient set in [5] ; a counterexample is due to A.J. Hoffman). However, various characterizations of neighbors on these polytopes are known that give some computational assistance in finding optimal extreme points [17].
For any permutation u let S(a) be the set of all unordered pairs of symbols {ai,a.} such that a reverses the order of a 
THE PRINCIPAL THEOREM (23) Theorem 3. Kemeny's rule is the unique preference function that is neutral, consistent, and Condorcet.
We shall in fact prove a stronger result. Define, for any PF f, the dual of f, -f, to be the PF that inverts the orders of f:
The trivial PF, T(@) , is the PF defined by
We shall show that (26) the only PF's that are neutral, consistent, and quasi-Condorcet are T, K, and -K. Moreover, where X 5 X is the set of all rationaZ mxm skew-symmetric matrices, there exists a unique extension of f to XQ that is neutral, consistent, and quasi-Condorcet.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 is similar to results in [I51 and 1161. With f as given, suppose @, 4' are two profiles on disjoint voter sets such that xm = xm'. Choose a profile $ on a voter set disjoint from those of 4 and 9' such that xmS' = x' "'
hence .by consistency From this it follows that whenever X' = X" then f(m) = £($'I (since we can always find 4" disjoint from and $' such that xm = Xm" = Xm') . We may therefore view f as defined on the domain of election matrices. Notice that any matrix in XQ can be expressed as a rational linear combination of election matrices. Indeed, for any i#j the profile with two voters having preference orders (a. ,,aj ,al ,a2,.. .am) and (amla m-1'"'' al,ai,a.) has nij =-n.. = 2 , and nhk=O for all other h,k, and any I 3 1 matrix in rQ can be expressed as a rational linear combination of these.
For any positive integer n> 0 and election matrix X define f((l/n)X) = f(X). This is well-defined, because if (l/n)X = (l/nl)X' then by consistency f(nX') = f(X') and f(nlX) = f (X); so f ( (l/n) )XI = f ( (l/nl)X' ) . It is easy to verify that this extended f is neutral, consistent, and quasi-Condorcet, and this is clearly the only extension of f to XQ that has these properties. 0
A particular consequence of the hypotheses of Lemma 1 is that f is anonymous, hence symmetric.
In the sequel, any f satisfying the three hypotheses (in particular, K) will be consid-Q ered as acting in the domain 5 .
Por the next lemma we need to introduce the notion of derived PF's. Proof. The verification of (i) is left to the reader; it may also be found in [13] . (1 -X)~EC.
One of the peculiar difficulties in proving results about consistent preference functions (and CF's) is that, while under various natural conditions, it is easy to extend their domain uniquely to the rationals (i.e. to include "fractional" voters) in such a way that consistency and the other conditions are still satisfied.
(There is in general no immediate way to obtain such an extension to the reals, even though in certain cases a unique extension may exist.) (See for example [I 5,161 . ) As a practical matter errors can develop if, during the proofs, one is not careful to restrict the analysis to 0-convex sets and rationalvalued vectors.
Once the desired characterization is obtained then the extension to the reals is usually obvious.
(On this point a difficulty is encountered in certain results in [ 121 , where for example Theorem 2 asserts incorrectly that a certain class of functions may be uniquely extended to the reals.)
To be able to work with Q-convex sets conveniently in the present context, we need the following results.
(Proofs may be found in [16] ).
Lemma 3 [16] . c c Qn is Q-convex if and only if C = Qn f? cvx C , where cvx C is the convex hull of C.
Lemma 4 [16] . If CSQn is Q-convex then cL (C) is convex. k Lemma 5 [16] . g C = u Si , where C c_kn is convex and k i= 1 is finite, then for some i,dimC = dimsi.
A particular consequence of Lemma 4 is that CGcvxCGcRC,
From this we deduce ri(cRC) = ri(cvxC) , so by Lemma 3, Qnf? ri (cRC) GC, and Qnn ri (cR (C) ) is dense in ri (cR (C) ) .
Proof of (26). Let f be a neutral, consistent, quasiCondorcet SPF.
To show that f is K, -K, or TI it suffices, by Lemma 2, to assume that f is Pareto and to show that f = K. The proof that f = K is by induction on the number of alternatives, m.
If m = 1 there is nothing to prove.
, ,
Suppose that m = 2. Then, by Lemma 1, f is symmetric and consistent; hence (for two alternatives) the associated choice -.
is Q-convex for each a E L (A) .
-1 Note that fil 2f-l (a) = {X E xQ : f (X) = {a)) and K, 2~-' 
xQn int
We claim that
xQ. int fil~ f-l {a) Q that is. f (X) = {o) for any X r X n int fil. Indeed. xu E fil . and Define a matrix X = (.xi 1 E xQ such that
for all other h,R . 
(52).
Now suppose f f K, that is, by (51) there is an X* such that f (X*) C K (X*) . Say f 01-c E K(X*) ,o E f (X*) ,T # f (X*) .
Let P* be the polytope {XEP :X* X = maxj.
--Since I K (x*) 1 2 2, dim P* 2 1, so by a theorem of Balinski 1 2 there is a path a = IT ,IT , . . . ,rk = T such that for 1 2 i < kr i+ 1 i is a neighbor of xIT on P and IT E K(X*) for 1 ( i ( k.
By (52), a = IT' ,n2 E K(X*) and a = IT' E f (X*) implies IT^ E f (X*) and so forth; we conclude that IT^ = T E f(X*) , a contradiction.
Thus f is identical to K. 0
CONCLUSION
In the social choice literature two divergent streams of thought are apparent. One, which stems from Borda's work, emphasizes scoring methods; the fundamental property enjoyed by these methods is that they are consistent, which amounts to saying that they satisfy a kind of Pareto principle for subgroups.
This condition seems very natural and desirable in the context of collective decision making, and it is difficult to see how a preference function not satisfying this property would be able to find general acceptance. The other, which grows out of Condorcet's proposal that an alternative able to get a majority over any other should be the most-preferred alternative, is the problem of extending this idea in a natural way to cases when a Condorcet alternative does not exist.
As we have shown, these two ideas, suitably interpreted for preference functions, are resolved in the method known as Kemeny's rule; moreover subject to the basic requirement that all alternatives be treated in an unbiased manner, Kemeny's rule is the only preference function satisfying the three properties.
The present development, compared to Kemeny's, also provides an interesting example of the use of axioms in the social sciences.
Kemeny axiomatized a distance measure by invoking certain mathematically appealing properties. But by concentrating on the distance minimizing aspect of the problem, the point was missed that it is the decision function itself, rather than the distance, that possesses the important properties.
